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Elite Integration – An Empirical Study 
Trygve Gulbrandsen  
Abstract: »Elitenintegration – Eine empirische Studie«. Elite integration has 
been a central topic within research on elites. In this paper, theoretical ideas 
about factors behind elite cohesion are discussed and empirically tested. The 
analyses presented in the paper show that ideological integration is strongest in 
elite groups where the share of members with upper/upper middle class origin 
is highest. This finding is valid whether the elite groups are located to the left 
or to the right in the political landscape. Various explanations of the finding are 
discussed. 
Keywords: elites, elite integration, elite backgrounds, social class. 
Introduction 
Within elite research and theory, much attention has been devoted to the ques-
tion of elite integration or cohesion (e.g., Mills 1959; Dye 1976; Putnam 1976; 
Hoffmann-Lange 1985; Kim and Patterson 1988; Higley et al. 1991; Kadushin 
1995; Bürklin and Rebenstorf 1997; Gulbrandsen 2005). Many scholars have 
argued that the establishment of a viable democracy depends in some important 
measure on the cohesiveness and unity exhibited by the leading elite groups in 
society. For instance, Keller (1963) has stated that as societies become more 
differentiated a considerable cohesion and consensus is needed on the top. 
Similarly, Putnam (1976) has supported the idea that elite integration fosters 
political stability and effectiveness. Higley and Burton (2006) have argued that 
the presence of consensually united elites is a basic condition for the emer-
gence of a liberal democracy. Other scholars have focussed upon elite cohesion 
as a prerequisite for a particular elite group’s collective power (for instance 
Useem 1984; Mizruchi 1992). 
Given its political significance, what then are the characteristics of elite in-
tegration? Putnam (1976) identified six “integrative factors” or “dimensions of 
integration”: social homogeneity, common recruitment patterns, personal inter-
action, value consensus, group solidarity and institutional context, of which, 
according to Putnam, value consensus is perhaps the most central. Higley and 
Moore (1981) suggested that the principal dimensions of elite integration in 
national and sector-specific elites are a consensus on values and personal inter-
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action. Kim and Patterson (1988) maintained that an elite group is integrated if 
its members share common social origins, educational and career experiences 
and recruitment paths. They also added that an elite group could be integrated 
by sharing basic values. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the relative significance 
of various factors fostering elite integration in different elite groups. It focuses 
on two questions: to what extent does shared class background influence the 
extent of ideological consensus within an elite group: and are common educa-
tional experiences more important than class background as a mechanism pro-
moting elite unity? In contrast to earlier studies of this type, I also include in 
the analysis issues and variables that have been highlighted as important in 
organizational demography (Lawrence 1996; 1997). I will for instance discuss 
whether same age and tenure among the members of an elite group influence 
the degree of consensus within the group.  
First, the proper unit of analysis has to be identified. Internationally there 
are many studies focussing upon individual elites and how their ideological and 
political attitudes are influenced by class background, education, career experi-
ences, gender, and sector affiliation. But these studies are not necessarily focus-
ing on elite integration. Elite integration is a property of a group. Accordingly, 
both the dependent and the independent variables have to be constructed and 
related statistically on the group level. To my knowledge, very few studies 
have previously conducted an empirical study comparing the level of integra-
tion in different elite groups on this level.  
Second, it is necessary to specify the relations between the dimensions of 
elite integration more precisely. In the previous literature the dimensions are 
frequently treated both as causes and effects. For instance, shared social origin 
is sometimes presented as a manifestation of elite integration, whereas at other 
times it is treated more like a factor or mechanism that promotes elite integra-
tion. This probably reflects the fact that various dimensions of elite integration 
in reality are closely inter-related with each other. For instance, elite interaction 
may stimulate value consensus. At the same time value consensus may pave 
the way for more interaction between elite persons and groups. Nevertheless, 
for analytic purposes it is necessary to distinguish between those dimensions 
that are manifestations of elite integration, and those dimensions that are more 
properly seen as fostering integration.  
Two more points need to be highlighted. The paper focuses, first, on ideo-
logical consensus as the main manifestation of elite integration. It then exam-
ines empirically to what extent variations in elite consensus are related to a set 
of factors that are treated as possible causes of these variations. Among the 
factors considered are similarities of social background and education within 
the individual elite groups, as well as the extent of shared experiences within 
the particular elite sector, as measured by similarity of age and tenure. Data are 
taken from the Norwegian Leadership Study 2000 and the sample comprises 
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holders of top formal positions in twelve main areas of the Norwegian society 
and represent 49 different elite sectors or groups.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Social Origin 
Elite integration in the form of ideological consensus can come about because 
the members of a particular elite group have shared common socialization 
experiences. Such common experiences may be created in childhood as a result 
of growing up in families belonging to the same social class. These shared 
experiences can create social homogeneity that furthers elite integration – even 
if the members of the elite groups have never met before. There are countless 
studies of elite social backgrounds that have demonstrated a high degree of 
homogeneity in the elites’ social origin (e.g., Hoffmann-Lange 1992; Bürklin 
and Rebenstorf et al. 1997; Hartmann 2000; Christiansen, Møller and Togeby 
2002; Gulbrandsen et al. 2002; Mastekaasa 2004). We also know that eco-
nomic, political and social elites are to a large extent recruited from upper class 
or upper middle class families (Putnam 1976). Even if homogeneity of class 
origin is not in itself a sufficient manifestation of elite unity, it may nonetheless 
foster political or ideological unity. It is natural to assume that the adult politi-
cal outlook would bear the marks of a person’s social origins, but as already 
noted by Putnam (1976, 22), studies from several countries have demonstrated 
that parent’s occupation or education have little consistent relationship to cur-
rent political opinions or behaviour: “The implication would seem to be that a 
leader’s views are influenced less by the social circumstance of his youth than 
by adult roles and affiliations.” This conclusion was corroborated in a study of 
Norwegian economic, political and social elites. It showed that the class back-
ground of the individual elite persons explains very little of the variation in 
elite ideological attitudes (Gulbrandsen and Engelstad 2005). Far more impor-
tant was the elite person’s institutional and sector affiliation.  
Nonetheless, it is possible that, within a particular institution, social homo-
geneity concerning class origin can stimulate mutual accommodation of ideo-
logical opinions among the persons occupying the formal leadership positions. 
In line with this idea, I expect that an elite group, whose members are drawn 
predominantly from a narrow range of social classes, will be more cohesive 
than one whose members have highly diverse social origins. 
 
Hypothesis 1A: The more similar the class background of members of an elite 
group, the more homogeneous they are concerning ideological opinions.  
 
Social classes are, however, broad categories exhibiting considerable social 
diversity. This diversity may undermine the development of similar orienta-
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tions and outlooks. The upper and perhaps also the upper middle classes may 
be an exception, however, because these classes are smaller and their members 
often live in the same geographical areas (Ljunggren 2010). As a result, mem-
bers of such small and concentrated classes may know each other personally or 
be related to each other. Such circumstances, in turn, can facilitate mutual 
accommodation and integration. Moreover, according to some scholars, per-
sons raised in upper and upper middle class families acquire a distinct culture 
or ethos, which fosters confidence in matters of behaviour and taste (Bourdieu 
1984). The naturalness that follows from this confidence can facilitate mutual 
adjustment and promote cohesion among members in an elite group. 
 
Hypothesis 1B: The more upper/upper middle class background is prevalent 
among members of an elite group, the less diverse the elite group is concerning 
ideological opinions. 
Educational Background 
Elite persons are also exposed to common socialization experiences by attend-
ing the same educational institutions. This can ensure similar training, foster 
the same professional outlook, and facilitate personal contacts and friendships. 
Schools influence students by what is taught and by what is learned. While 
young people are studying to become economists, lawyers, engineers and 
priests, they are moulded by the curricula, by subjects they are taught, by val-
ues communicated to them by teachers, and by interactions with their fellow 
students. Gradually they adopt the values, the world-views and ideologies that 
are common to all those aspects of educational environment. 
Several institutions of higher education are also preparing their students for 
entry into particular professions. A vital part of this preparation is socialisation 
to professional values and codes of conduct. When the students graduate and 
enter their profession, they are, therefore, already familiar with these values 
and norms. I believe that all these socializing processes pave the way for the 
integration of those who end up as leaders in particular sectors or institutions.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The degree of ideological integration or similarity in an elite 
group varies positively with the percentage of the members of the group having 
the same educational background. 
The Significance of Age Groups 
Personal interaction and group cohesion within organizations may be particu-
larly prevalent among persons belonging to the same age group. Anthropologi-
cal studies have demonstrated that members of several developing societies are 
organized into age groups that operate as independent collective actors (Eisen-
stadt 1956; Kurimoto and Simonse 1998). In advanced societies, age groups are 
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less salient, but as Riley (1986) notes, even in modern Western societies simi-
larity of age may stimulate similar attitudes and create a basis for community, 
especially within the educational system and within certain careers. 
The presence of age groups varies with the type of career system. In the lit-
erature it is common to distinguish between closed and open career systems 
(Sørensen 1986). In closed career systems, the positions are closed in the sense 
that the incumbents cannot be arbitrarily dismissed. Vacancies occur only when 
incumbents choose to change position or leave the organization. Those persons 
who control the access to the positions can decide who will fill the vacancies, 
but not when a particular position becomes vacant. Closed career systems are, 
according to Sørensen (1986), typical of bureaucracies and “internal labour 
markets” where individual jobs are connected to each other on a job ladder. 
New entrants are usually recruited at the bottom of a career ladder, frequently 
directly from the educational institutions, and are then gradually promoted up 
the ladder when vacancies occur at the next level. As will be demonstrated 
below, several elite groups in our study operate in such closed career systems.  
In open career systems, the positions or jobs are open for any candidate who 
meets particular qualification requirements. The jobs in such systems are not 
connected to each other in career ladders, and recruitment is often “lateral”. 
Thus while in closed career systems the employees on the same level tend to be 
of same age, in open career systems such similarity is rare. One reason for this 
is that the entrants in closed systems are recruited directly from the respective 
educational institutions. Another reason is that in closed career systems it takes 
similar length of time for all the employees before they are promoted to the 
next level (if they are promoted at all). The implication of this dynamics is that 
those persons who end up being promoted to the top leader positions in closed 
systems tend to belong to the same age group. 
In line with Riley (1986), I expect that such age group similarity fosters 
similar ideas and ideological leanings. Members of the age groups follow each 
other through their respective careers and life courses and often become well-
acquainted or even friends. As a result, they contact each other and interact 
frequently. Against this background, I expect that members of elite groups who 
are similar in age will manifest more ideological cohesion than members of 
elite groups who belong to different age groups.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The more similar members of an elite group are in age, the less 
diverse their ideological leanings and opinions. 
Tenure in Organizations 
Cohesion is also generated by leaders’ shared experiences resulting from work-
ing within and rising through the ranks in the same institution, organization or 
sector, independent of their age when first entering the institution. Firstly, as 
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new recruits entering the institution, they are objects of similar attempts to 
form them into “good citizens”. They are moulded to certain standards of work, 
norms, work habits and even basic views characteristic of the organization, 
which was repeated every time they rose to a new level within the organization. 
Such organizational socialization promotes integration of professional attitudes, 
and probably also fosters similar ideological orientations, independently of the 
extent of interaction between the various leaders in the respective institutions 
or organizations. Secondly, elite integration is also enhanced by the networks 
of personal communication, trust and friendship between the ascending leaders 
as they gradually climb the organisational hierarchies. The greater the interac-
tion between leaders, the more they would comprehend each other’s attitudes, 
and the greater the likelihood they would be ready to coordinate activities.  
The effect of these processes of organizational socialization and mutual in-
fluence is probably stronger among the long-term members of an elite group, 
institution and/or organization. The Leadership Study does not contain infor-
mation about the time spent in the present institution/organization, but it does 
ask leaders how many years they have held their leadership positions. It is 
probable that the impact of the described processes on the elites’ ideological 
attitudes is strengthened the longer their tenure as leaders. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The longer on average that members of an elite group have held 
their positions as top leaders, the more similarity the members of the group 
exhibit concerning their ideological orientation. 
Data and Method 
The sample of top leaders in the Leadership Study was constructed on the basis 
of a so-called “position” method, i.e. we included those persons who occupy 
the most important leadership positions in twelve areas of Norwegian society: 
(1) the church, (2) the State administration, (3) culture, (4) mass media, (5) 
private business, (6) cooperative enterprises, (7) public business enterprises, (8) 
organizations, (9) universities and research institutes, (10) police and the judi-
cial system, (11) military services, and (12) politics.1 
Within each of these sectors we selected various categories of organizations. 
In some of the areas, the main institutions or organizations are organized as 
hierarchies. In these areas we selected the highest positions within the organ-
izational hierarchy. Within the Church, for instance, we selected all bishops 
                                                             
1  In the political sector, members of the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament), leaders of the 
political parties as well as members of the Cabinet and their political secretaries were se-
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and then all rectors, but also included leaders of the Church council. Similarly, 
in the military services we included top leaders on the three highest levels of 
command, treating each level of leaders as a separate elite group. In other ar-
eas, especially those without a similar organizational unity, we chose top lead-
ers of the main organizations. For instance, in the area of culture, we included 
top leaders of the main national museums, theatres and orchestras, the members 
of the Arts Council of Norway, as well as leaders of the main artist organiza-
tions. Altogether, we interviewed top leaders from 49 subgroups or sectors (cf. 
Appendix 1 for a list of the groups). Personal interviews were held with 1,710 
top leaders, which represent 87 per cent of those approached for interview. In 
the statistical analyses reported below, the 49 elite groups are the units of 
analysis.  
As indicator of the leaders’ ideological orientation, we used a “public/pri-
vate” index including questions measuring the extent to which the individual 
leaders endorse some main properties of the welfare state model. We asked the 
leaders whether they agreed with the following four statements: (1) “It is more 
important to extend public services than to reduce taxes”; (2) “In Norway one 
should put stronger emphasis upon privatisation and a smaller public sector”; 
(3) “The state influence on private business should be reduced”; (4) “In Nor-
way we have gone far enough in the reduction of income inequalities”. The 
index is based on the group mean of the evaluations of the four statements and 
ranges from 1 to 4, with 4 indicating full support for the public sector and poli-
cies for levelling incomes, while 1 indicates that the leaders favour a smaller 
public sector, more privatisation and a curtailing of the state power over private 
business. The reliability of index is high (Cronbach’s alpha 0.83). 
Figure 1, which presents the mean score of each of the twelve elite sectors 
on the public-private index, shows that most of the sectors cluster around the 
midpoint value (2.5) on the index. Top leaders within private business distin-
guish themselves by being much in favour of private solutions, reduced taxes, 
and a termination of measures aimed at reduction of income inequalities. On 
the other side, we see that the top leaders within the culture sector and the 
Church are much more in favour of the welfare state. These findings indicate 
that the basic functions, purposes and values of the various institutions influ-
ence the ideological orientation of the top leaders within these institutions.  
I have also computed the mean score and standard deviation on the public-
private index for all 49 subgroups. The standard deviation on the public-private 
index of each group, indicating degree of diversity of ideological opinion 
within the group, is used as the dependent variable in the statistical analyses.  
Class of origin is constructed on the basis of information about the father’s 
occupation, or mother’s occupation where there is no information about the 
father. The class index has ten categories, with the value 1 indicating that the 
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father (or mother) of the elite in question was a leader of a business enterprise, 
and the value 10 showing that the parent was an unskilled worker.2 I have 
treated the variable as continuous, and for each elite group I have computed the 
mean score and the standard deviation on this class variable. The standard 
deviation on the class variable indicates the degree of diversity (or similarity) 
within the group as to class background. 
Figure 1: Norwegian Elite Sectors/Groups 
 Located Along the Private-Public Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To measure the extent to which members of the various elite groups have a 
similar education, I have calculated within each group the percentage of lead-
ers with the same type and level of education.3 The standard deviation of age 
within each subgroup measures to what extent these elite groups are also ho-
mogeneous with respect to age. In the analyses I have also included the elite 
                                                             
2  See Gulbrandsen et al. (2002) for a more detailed description of this index. The coding 
categories were the following: 
(i) Managers of private companies 
(ii) University lecturers, professors, professionals (“akademikere” in Norwegian) 
(iii) Civil engineers and managers/leaders in public sector 
(iv) Middle-level employees on the in private companies 
(v) Middle-level employees in the public sector 
(vi) Shopkeepers and managers of small businesses 
(vii) Lower salaried staff 
(viii) Farmers, fishermen and similar 
(ix) Skilled workers 
(x) Non-skilled workers 
3  The index for education is rather detailed and was constructed by Statistics Norway. It takes 
into account the level and the kind of education (e.g. field of studies). Group homogeneity 
with respect to education implies that the members of an elite group have achieved both a 
similar level of education and followed a similar track. 
 
1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4
Politicians
Culture
Church
State bureaucracy
Universities and research
Organizations
Police and courts of justice
Mass media
Cooperative sector
Military services
State enterprises
Private business
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groups’ mean score on the age variable. The average tenure within each elite 
group measures the average length of incumbency of the top leaders. A statisti-
cal description of the dependent and independent variables is given in Table 1, 
while Table 2 shows the bivariate correlations between the variables.  
In order to test the hypotheses formulated in the preceding section I have 
carried out a multivariate analysis (OLS-regression) relating the degree of 
similarity of ideological attitudes within the elite groups (measured by the 
standard deviation on the left-right index) to the explanatory variables (cf. 
Table 3). I have omitted the variable “tenure” since Table 2 shows that this 
variable is not significantly related to ideological diversity/cohesion. As the 
number of members varies between the individual elite groups, a weighting 
procedure was applied in connection with the statistical analyses (both the 
correlation analyses and the multivariate analyses) were conducted.  
Findings 
Table 1 shows that the mean standard deviation on the public private index (the 
measure of ideological diversity) is 0.67. Closer inspection of the data demon-
strates that the degree of similarity of ideological attitudes is strongest within 
the elite group of generals and admirals (0.18) and among owners of large 
private companies who are also CEOs (0.28) or chairmen of the board (0.39) of 
their company. The degree of similarity regarding ideological opinions is also 
relatively high among leaders of the Church Council (0.38) and among bishops 
(0.40). The dispersion on the private-public index is widest, as expected, 
among leaders of political parties and the members of parliament. The degree 
of similarity as to ideological attitudes is otherwise smallest among chief edi-
tors (0.89) and leading journalists in mass media (0.88), and among top leaders 
in the Research Council of Norway (0.89).  
Table 1: Summary Statistics on Elite Characteristics 
 Mean Min. Max. 
Ideology, mean 2.5 1.4 3.4 
Ideology, std. dev. 0.7 0.2 1.1 
Class, mean 4.9 1.9 7.1 
Class, std. dev. 2.7 0.7 3.5 
Perc. with same education 24 5 100 
Age, mean 52 43 60 
Age, std. dev. 6.8 2.8 12.2 
Tenure, std. dev. 5.5 1.0 10.9 
Source: Norwegian Leadership Study 2000. 
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The mean class background within the elite groups is 4.9, which means that 
most of the elite groups have a high average class background. As follows from 
the operational definition of class, the owners of large of private companies 
who are also CEOs are located on the top of the class ladder (1.9). The mean 
class position is also high among the Supreme Court judges (2.7), top leaders 
of large private law firms (3.3), and bishops (3.5). The mean class level is low 
among chairmen of the board of large cooperatives (7.1), leaders of the politi-
cal parties (7.1), brigadiers/flag commanders (6.4), and rectors of universities 
and university colleges (6.3). This finding corroborates Putnam’s law of in-
creasing disproportion (1976: 33-37) stating that the share of individuals with a 
higher class background increases with the level in the political hierarchy, i.e. 
that ministers have a higher class background than leading parliamentarians, 
backbenchers, party activists, etc., in descending order.  
It is noticeable that elites at the top of those sectors which are characterized 
by closed career systems (see more about this below) tend to be recruited from 
higher social class backgrounds than elites on the next-lower hierarchical lev-
els. For instance, while the Supreme Court judges are recruited from the upper 
echelons of the class structure, the presiding judges of superior courts have a 
mean class rank which is clearly lower (5.3). Similarly, bishops rank higher 
(3.5) than rectors (5.2), and generals/admirals higher (4.5) than major gener-
als/rear-admirals (5.3). These patterns seem to indicate that, to a large extent, 
originating from the upper or upper middle classes is an advantage for acquir-
ing a top leadership position within the judicial system, the Church and the 
military services. 
The mean standard deviation on the class variable is 2.7. The degree of simi-
larity concerning class background is strongest among generals and admirals 
(0.71), owner-managers (1.05), Supreme Court judges (1.63), bishops (1.84), 
and ambassadors (1.88). As we just saw, most of these groups are also charac-
terized by a high mean rank on the class ladder. The degree of similarity is 
smallest among top leaders in sports organizations (3.49), members of the 
National Arts Council (3.31), CEOs in the state enterprises (3.24), and CEOs in 
the mass media (3.23)  
On average, 24 per cent of various elite group members have the same edu-
cation. Similar education is prevalent, not surprisingly, within the Church, 
within the military services and within the police and the courts of justice.  
The age distribution is least dispersed among generals and admirals (2.82) 
and major generals and rear admirals (2.80), and among leaders of the Church 
Council (3.05), ambassadors (3.57), and chief justices of county courts (4.33). 
The standard deviation for age is highest among chairs of the board of state 
enterprises (12.18), top leaders of non-profit organizations (11.41), mayors in 
the largest municipalities (9.95), members of parliament (9.36), chairs of the 
board of large cooperatives (8.79), top leaders of private law firms (7.96), 
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leaders of private culture enterprises (7.92), and editors in the mass media 
(7.86). 
Mean tenure within the groups is 6.7 years, but is particularly high in the 
following elite groups: the business owners who also are chairs of the board of 
their companies (13 years), leaders of the Church Council (12), chairs of the 
board of private companies (11), leading senior journalists (11), and members 
of the National Arts Council (11). Low mean tenure is prevalent among the top 
leaders in the military services (1, 3 and 3 respectively in the three groups of 
higher military officers), among vice-presidents in state enterprises (2.5), and 
among ambassadors (3). 
Earlier in this paper, I distinguished between closed and open career sys-
tems. Is it possible to identify these career systems in the sectors or institutions 
to which the various elite groups belong? If I use a low standard deviation of 
the age variable within an elite group as an indicator of a closed career system, 
the Church, the military services and the Foreign Ministry all seem to have 
closed career systems, which fits with common knowledge about these three 
institutions. The much higher standard deviation among non-profit organiza-
tions indicates that within this sector the career system is quite open. If we 
subtract mean tenure from mean age within each elite group, we get another 
indicator of an open career system – the mean age at which the top leader ob-
tained his position. Using this indicator, mass media and the culture sector also 
appear to have open career systems. In both of these sectors young and talented 
persons have a good chance to obtain top positions, bypassing older, but not 
necessarily less qualified candidates. 
The correlation matrix in Table 2 demonstrates that the degree of ideological 
integration (or diversity) within the elite groups is statistically related both to 
(1) the mean score on the class level variable, (2) the percentage of the mem-
bers in the elite groups having the same education, and to (3) the degree of age 
diversity. Firstly, these bivariate correlations indicate that the more members of 
an elite group are recruited from the upper classes, the less ideologically di-
verse and more ideologically integrated they are. Secondly, the more leaders in 
an elite group have the same educational background, the less diverse their 
ideological attitudes. Thirdly, the more members of a group are of a similar 
age, the more the group is ideologically integrated. Since the mean and the 
standard deviation of the public-private (ideology) index are based upon the 
answers to the same questions, as expected, these two variables correlate 
strongly. 
The degree of ideological diversity is not, however, significantly related to 
the degree of diversity in class background, which implies that hypothesis 1A 
is not supported. Similarly, neither mean of age nor mean length of incum-
bency are related to the degree of ideological integration. 
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Previous studies have shown that elite persons’ ideological opinions are only 
negligibly influenced by their social origin (Gulbrandsen and Engelstad 2005). 
In contrast, in Table 2 we can see that on the elite group level, mean class level 
of the group members is significantly related to the groups’ mean location 
along the private-public index. The more members of an elite group are re-
cruited from lower classes, the more the group is located to the left in the ideo-
logical landscape. In addition, as Table 2 shows, the extent to which members 
have a similar educational background is strongly and negatively correlated 
with the variable measuring the age distribution within the elite groups (Pear-
son’s r is -0.48). This finding implies that in elite groups where the members 
have the same type of education they are also similar of age. This relationship 
may indicate that organizations which recruit predominantly from one type of 
education have a closed career system. Such a system entails that each new 
cohort of graduates entering the organization will have about the same age, 
resulting in same-age cohorts also on the higher hierarchical levels of the or-
ganization.  
Table 3: Degree of Ideological Cohesion/Dispersion Among Elite Groups.  
OLS regression. Non-standardized Estimates. 
Standard Error in Parentheses. Weighted. 
 Estimates 
Intercept 
0.172  
(0.2437) 
Class std. dev. 
-0.026 
(0.065) 
Class mean 
    0.079** 
(0.023) 
Share of leaders with same 
education 
-0.172 
(0.129) 
Age std. dev. 
0.013  
(0.014) 
Age mean 
0,003 
(0.006) 
R2 0.25 
N 49 
Source: Norwegian Leadership Study 2000. 
 
Table 3 shows the results of a multivariate analysis including the following 
independent variables: (i) class diversity, (ii) the elite group members’ mean 
score on the class variable, (iii) the share of group members with same educa-
tion, (iv) age diversity and (v) mean age of the group members. The analysis 
shows that when controlling for the other variables, only one of the independ-
ent variables is significantly related to ideological integration (measured by the 
standard deviation on the private-public index), namely the mean score of the 
elite group members on the class variable. Age diversity and similarity of edu-
cation is no longer statistically related to ideological diversity/cohesion. Ac-
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cordingly, in the analysis presented in Table 3 there is no support for the hy-
potheses 1A, 2, 3 and 4. 
In order to control for the elite groups’ location along the ideological left-
right continuum, I have also carried out a separate analysis including the elite 
groups’ mean score on the ideology variable. The result of this analysis is not 
reported here. In this model, the mean score on the class variable still is signifi-
cantly related to ideological integration (on 5 per cent level), albeit the statisti-
cal relationship is weak.  
Discussion 
Elite cohesion has been a central topic within research on elites. In this paper I 
have set out to test theoretical assumptions about factors that promote integra-
tion within elite groups. I have attempted to test these ideas through an empiri-
cal strategy concentrating upon elite groups as units of analysis and using vari-
ables aggregated from individual level data on elites. This implies that the 
variables are treated as properties of the elite groups. Such empirical strategy is 
not without problems. For example, the N in the statistical analyses is very 
small making it difficult to obtain robust significant results. 
Overall, only one of the hypotheses – Hypothesis 1B – is corroborated by 
the analyses. As expected, an upper class/upper middle class origin among the 
members seems to foster ideological similarity or cohesion to a larger extent 
than a lower class background. This finding is valid independently of where an 
elite group is located on the ideological right and left continuum. For instance, 
bishops are to a large extent recruited from the upper and upper middle class, 
but it is worth noting that their views are located to the left of the ideological 
spectrum.  
How can we explain these findings? I suggest that cohesion is caused by so-
cialization within the main organizations and formal institutions within each 
elite sector. The fact that the ideological leanings of individual leaders are 
primarily explained by their sector affiliation indicates that these leaders have 
been socialized to adopt the basic values and orientations of “their” institution 
or organization.  
In each elite sector there are various institutions and organizations that were 
originally created in order to pursue specific goals or to perform particular 
social functions. To secure the performance of these functions, complex sys-
tems of interrelated norms proscribing or prescribing certain action have been 
established or have evolved. To accomplish the purposes of the individual 
institutions and organizations, their leaders have been given authority by spe-
cific principals – for instance voters, members, business owners. When exercis-
ing this authority, the leaders are both answerable to the principals and bound 
to follow the basic institutional norms. To shoulder these responsibilities, the 
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new leaders have to internalize the basic goals and values of their institution or 
organization.  
In several sectors, the necessary socialization of candidates for top leader-
ship positions is accomplished through formally designed career systems. Pre-
vious research on private firms has shown that the main purpose of career 
systems, particular closed career systems, is to select leaders who can work 
smoothly together (Gulbrandsen 1999). By letting candidates for leadership 
positions work their way up through the ranks of the organization, the employ-
ers can continually monitor their behaviour. In this way, the employers can 
ensure that those who finally reach to the top have accepted the organization’s 
philosophy and the appropriate norms of interaction. Similarly, Kanter (1977) 
has shown that homogeneity in a top leader group is an intended outcome, and 
that top positions frequently are surrounded by uncertainty. In her own words: 
“Bureaucracies are social inventions that supposedly reduce the uncertain to the 
predictable and routine. Yet much uncertainty remains – many situations in 
which individual people rather than impersonal procedures must be trusted” 
(Kanter 1977: 48). She argues that this uncertainty causes top managers to 
emphasize trust, loyalty and mutual understanding based on shared values 
when recruiting their top aides. This strong emphasis upon trust is socially 
exclusive. The top leaders develop tight inner circles, excluding strangers, and 
they keep control in the hands of socially homogeneous peers (Kanter 1977, 
49). 
Socialization to a set of shared values is also important within the public 
sector, particularly in the military services and in public administration. Incum-
bents of top positions in the public sector are required to be politically neutral 
and loyal to the political leadership. Democracy entrusts these public institu-
tions with the control of significant power resources, but at the same time 
makes them accountable to democratically legitimised politicians. Typically, 
both the military services and important parts of the public administration 
therefore are characterized by more or less closed career systems.  
It is possible that leaders who have grown up in upper or upper middle class 
families have acquired qualities that make them particularly suited to go 
through the socialization process in the respective elite organizations. Their 
upbringing, for example, may instil a career ambition, which may give them a 
strong motivation to adopt the world view and the behavioural style necessary 
to climb the ladders of the particular organization. Or, they may develop a 
capacity for social learning that facilitates the adoption of manners and opin-
ions essential for a career in the specific institution. Accordingly, leaders’ 
willingness and aptitude to become socialized to the standards, beliefs and 
models of their respective institutions may bring them to the top of the institu-
tion. The overall effect of these processes is that leaders develop similar ideo-
logical orientations.  
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An alternative explanation is that similar upbringing in the upper or upper 
middle classes encourages mutual ideological adaptation. It has also been 
claimed that having a similar upper class origin involves similar social experi-
ences and a shared cultural capital, and that such elites often also have mutual 
acquaintances. These connections help ease communication, foster mutual 
understanding, and encourage professional collaboration between the members 
of a particular elite group. In other words, ideological cohesion is promoted 
through interpersonal processes of mutual adjustment facilitated by a similar 
upbringing. 
A third and final explanation for the recruitment of individuals from upper 
class backgrounds to top positions may finally lie in additional qualities that 
elite selectorates consider as necessary for these positions that are not acquired 
through socialization within the respective institutions but are results of the 
upbringing in the upper/upper middle class. For instance, selectorates may 
search for candidates with high levels of self-confidence, the ability to appear 
publicly, or an unassuming way of relating to other people. They may also look 
for a particular cultural repertoire or for evidence of the candidate’s belonging 
to an influential network. Such class-biased selection has been detected by 
Hartman (2000) in a study of recruitment of top leaders in private businesses in 
Germany. As a result of class bias, leaders within a particular elite institution 
become similar to each other in their social origin, orientations and behaviour. 
Conclusion 
The analyses presented show that (ideological) cohesion is strongest in those 
elite groups where the mean of members with upper/upper middle class back-
ground is highest. There are several possible explanations of this finding. Per-
sons from the upper/upper middle classes can have qualities that superiors 
consider significant for holding top leader positions; they may be more psycho-
logically and socially prepared to pass through socialization processes neces-
sary for admittance to elite groups; and they can acquire class based social 
skills and connections that facilitate mutual communication and accommoda-
tion. Probably all these factors are relevant in explaining the findings. 
Appendix 1: List of Elite Sectors and Groups 
(I) The church 
1. Bishops, 2. Rectors, 3. Leaders of the Church council 
 
(II) The State administration 
4. Permanent secretaries in the ministries, 5. General directors in the min-
istries, 6. Chiefs of State Services, 7. Regional commissioners and om-
budsmen, 8. Ambassadors 
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(III) Culture 
9. Top leaders of cultural institutions, 10. Members of the National Arts 
Council, 11. Leaders of artist organizations, 12. Leaders of private cul-
ture entrerprises 
 
(IV) Mass media 
13. Chief editors, 14. CEOs in mass media, 15. Editors, 16. Leading se-
nior journalists 
 
(V) Private business 
17. Chairmen of the board in private companies, 18. Chief Executive Of-
ficers/Managing directors, 19. Main owner and chairman of the board, 
20. Main owner and CEO, 21. Vice-presidents in private companies 
 
(VI) Cooperative enterprises 
22. Chairmen of the board in large cooperatives, 23. CEOs in coopera-
tives  
 
(VII) State enterprises 
24. Chairmen of the board in state enterprises, 25. CEO in state enterpris-
es, 26. Vice presidents in state enterprises  
 
(VIII) Organizations 
27. Top leaders in employer associations, 28. Labour union leaders, 29. 
Top leaders of industry associations, 30. Top leaders of non-profit organ-
izations, 31. Top leaders of national sports federations  
 
(IX) Universities and research institutes 
32. Rectors of universities and university colleges, 33. Deans at the uni-
versities, 34. Leaders of large research institutes, 35. Top leaders in the 
Research Council of Norway, 36. Top leaders within other parts of the 
research system 
 
(X) Police and the judicial system 
37. Chiefs of police, 38. Supreme Court judges, 39. Presiding judges of 
superior courts, 40. Chief justices of county courts and stipendiary magi-
strate’s courts, 41. Top leaders of the prosecuting authorities, 42. Top 
leaders of large, private law firms 
 
(XI) Military services 
43. Generals/admirals, 44. Major generals/rear-admirals, 45. Brigadi-
ers/Flag commanders 
 
(XII) Politicians 
46. Members of Parliament, 47. Parliamentary secretaries, 48. Leaders of 
the political parties, 49. Mayors in the largest municipalities 
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